One day before Spain formally terminated its rule in the Western Sahara, Frenle Polisario unilaterally declared a "Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic" (27 Feb. 1976 ). Since then, Algeria, the main rival of Morocco in the region, granted political and military support to Frenle Polisario. Frente Polisario military attacks forced Mauritania to pull out of the war (1978) and to renounce her share of the former Western Sahara (1979) , which was consequently annexed by Morocco, too. Frente Polisario military attacks against Morocco intensified afterwards, but diminished in the mid-80s, after the Moroccan army had completed a huge defensive wall with sophisticated electronic equipment. This sand-wall effectively protected nearly 90 % of the territory from guerrilla attacks, although this measure did not completely end the war. In 1991 the UN brokered a cessation of hostilities, which has lasted up to now. A political solution is, however, still pending. In 1966 a UN General Assembly resolution had already demanded the implementation of the Saharawi's right to selfgovernment, but twice the colonial power Spain cancelled the promised referendum (in 1971 and 1975) . After the Spanish withdrawal neither the OAU, the Arab League nor the UN were able to solve the problem.
Finally, in 1988 both Morocco and Frenle Polisario accepted the UN Secretary General's settlement proposals. They provided for a interim period during which the special representative of the Secretary General would have sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to a referendum, in which all the people of the Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) became operational in September 1991. It was established to monitor the cease-fire as well as to prepare and conduct a referendum, which was originally planned for 1992. However, the implementation process was soon lagging behind and in 1996 MINURSO was on the brink of collapse. In 1997 the newly appointed personal envoy of the UN Secretary General, James Baker III (USA), managed to broker an agreement on the main divergent views. Identification of voters resumed, but was repeatedly interrupted because of opposite views of the two parties. In January 2000 MINURSO published a provisional list of 86 381 identified voters. However, more than 130 000 (!) appeals have been forwarded, mainly from applicants living in Morocco. For the first time the UN Secretary General raised doubts that there could be consensual implementation of the settlement plan. He asked his Personal Envoy, James Baker III, to review the process and try to seek agreement between the parties.
Many factors have made a solution in the Western Sahara difficult. It is extremely difficult to identify legitimate voters in a territory composed of artificial boundaries and occupied partly by nomadic tribes. Furthermore, the conflict is embedded in a complicated framework of competing interests:
• political aspirations of the native inhabitants who share a long history of infighting and changing loyalties;
• economic, strategic and political aspirations of rival regional powers (Morocco, Algeria, The conflict, however, did not disappear from the scene. Frente Polisario's wellmotivated guerilleros -numbering some 10 to 15000 -have maintained a striking capability and make the Moroccan administration of the territory very costly. Approximately ISO 000 Moroccan soldiers are permanently stationed in the Western Sahara, approximately one half of the army. Furthermore, Frente Polisario managed to keep the Western Sahara question on the international agenda, even after the Soviet Union had collapsed and its main supporter, Algeria had to face internal turmoil.
The military and political stalemate forced both sides to accept the UN peace plan. It soon turned out that the two parties had divergent views regarding the criteria for voter eligibility.8 Frente Polisario insisted that only the 73 497 inhabitants, which were counted by the Spanish administration in 1974, and their descendants form the basis for a referendum. Frente Polisario hopes for a quick implementation of a referendum, since far more than 100000 West Saharan exiles (having lived in tents in Western-Algeria for nearly 25 years) desperately want to return home. However, time is not on Frente Polisario's side. Frente Polisario repeatedly accused Morocco of delaying the process, of blackmailing MINURSO and loading the voters' list with foreigners.
Morocco argued with some justification, that the Spanish census had to be modified as a number of Western Saharans had fled from Spanish colonial rule to Morocco and nomadic tribes had not properly been represented in the Spanish census. It seemed, however, that Morocco did not speed up the implementation of the process. Originally it had demanded that no less than 170 000 additional names should be added to the list, and MINURSO members repeatedly criticised Morocco to be uncooperative in many ways.9
In the mid-90s the MINURSO operation became more and more ineffective. The US Congress regarded it as a symbol of UN waste and inefficiency by the US Congress. MINURSO seemed to repeat the UNPROFOR example in Bosnia-Herzegovina: an undermanned and under-equipped mission deployed between contesting parties without a James Baker managed to bring about direct talks between the two parties and brokered the "Houston Agreement", which includes the following points: 1 1
• Only a limited number of sub-tribal groups will be added to the Spanish census and assessed during the voters' identification process;
• members of the three contested sub-tribal groups will only report individually to the Identification Commission and not be sponsored by Morocco on a large scale;
• the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will be in charge of the repatriation of refugees;
• the UN will have the sole and exclusive authority on all matters relating to the referendum;
• the parties agree on a code of conduct for the interim period, which includes freedom of expression and freedom of movement for all inhabitants as well as for international • nothing is agreed before everything is agreed upon.
Why did the US take up a leading role in the Western Sahara ,conflict for the first time?'l It seems that Washington has come to the conclusion that neither side has the potential to win the war militarily. In 1994 Frente Polisario had threatened to resume hostilities, should the implementation process get stuck. Such escalation could now destabilise the whole region, since there is a murderous civil war taking place in Algeria. Washington has moved politically much closer towards the Algerian government, whereas Morocco today is not as important an ally today as it was during the Cold War. In addition, the United States are exploring promising mineral resources in Algeria. Growing tensions between Algeria and
Morocco might furthermore lead to vice-versa encouragement of Islamist opposition groups.
A desperate Frente Polisario could take to international terrorism, as it once threatened to do in 1996
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, and intensify links with dissident movements in the neighbouring countries, not only in Algeria, but also in Mali and Niger. Saharawi refugees could lose their hope for a peaceful solution and move from Algeria to neighbouring countries in the South, thereby destabilising these countries and their fragile ethnic and political balance.
The United States does not perceive a Frente Polisario government as a security threat for the United States any longer, as it is neither Islamist nor socialist (and has probably never been hard-core Marxist-Leninist).
There is also no danger of Soviet, Cuban or Libyan involvement in the conflict any more.
It must also be taken into account that ongoing conflict in the Western Sahara will jeopardise the future of the fragile Arab Maghreb Union and thereby indirectly destabilise the region, too. Furthermore, it seems that the United States seem to be interested in expanding their influence in North Africa at the expense of France, as is the case in Central Africa.
Therefore the United States pressurised both parties, and especially the Moroccan King Hassan, to come to an agreement on the disputed questions.
In September 1998 the identification process was completed (with 147350 applicants convoked), with the exception of the members of three sub-tribal groupings. Furthermore, status-of-forces and status-of-UNHCR agreements with Morocco were still pending. In
October 1998 the UN Se,cretary General, Kofi Annan, presented a package to the parties in order to speed up the implementation. This included:
• the initiation of the appeals process for already identified applicants at the same time as the identification of remaining applicants from the three sub-tribal groupings;
• the effective formalisation of the presence of the Office of the UNHCR in the territory to allow the ne,cessary preparation for the repatriation of refugees; !nlernalianaies Afrika/arum, 32/2 (Bonn, 1996), 129.
Sci entia Militaria -29 1999
• a revised schedule, under which the transitional period would start in June/July 1999 and the referendum be held in December 1999.
Whereas Frente Polisario acceded to the package in November, the Moroccan government demanded certain amendments. Again the referendum process was halted. On 31 January 1999 the UN Security Council increased its pressure on Morocco and threatened not to extend MINURSO's mandate. In a more constructive mood, Morocco then entered into discussions about the implementation of identification and appeals protocols; it also signed status-of-UNHCR and a status-of-forces agreements in January and February 1999 respectively.14 The Moroccan government expressed its "shock and disappointment" questioned the identification procedures. In particular, it charged that oral testimony was not properly processed. The Moroccan government stated that it could not accept a referendum "that does not include the participation of all of the citizens from the southern provinces". 16
With close to 140 000 appeals submitted, the prospect of a referendum seems more remote than ever. The Front Polisario questions the justification of most appeals on formal grounds and warns not to delay the timetable any further. Frente Polisario representatives repeatedly threatened to take to arms again, should the settlement plan prove unworkable.
In his pessimistic Report dating from 17 February 2000 the UN Secretary General had to admit that the timetable envisaged was no longer valid.
17 A date for the referendum, which had been repeatedly postponed since 1992, could not be set with certainty. He also referred to the fact that there was no progress made with respect to cross-border confidence-building measures, as mentioned in the Security Council Resolution 1282 (1999). Furthermore, the UNHCR draft repatriation protocol had not been concluded with the four parties Algeria, Frente Polisario, Mauretania, Morocco because of some fundamental differences between the parties.
For the first time the Secretary General questioned the practicability of a referendum. He asked his Personal Envoy, James A. Baker III, to consult again with the parties in order to explore ways and means to achieve an early, durable and agreed resolution of their dispute. In its resolution 1292 (2000) The losing party could take to arms again, should it not be willing to accept the result of the referendum or the way it was conducted. There is no enforcement mechanism envisioned by the settlement plan calling for the use of military means in case the result were not to be recognised and accepted by one party. This danger must be taken into account, since the two parties have settled for a "winner takes all" instead of a compromise solution, which could mean autonomy for the Western Sahara within the Moroccan Kingdom.
The following main conditions seem to be necessary for a successful referendum:
• continuing leadership and pressure from outside,
• a strict timetable and clear commitments from both parties,
• consequences from the side ofMINURSO when engagements are not met,
• quick repatriation ofrefugees, which will make the implementation of the settlement much more probable,
• some follow-up mechanism which is not part of MINURSO's mandate (it only provides the retreat of MINURSO personnel within four to six weeks after the referendum),
• back:-stage agreements between Morocco and Frente Polisario to accommodate the loser (as was essential in the South African negotiated transfer of power).
One can only speculate if such a back-stage deal was struck in Houston or will still be on the agenda. 16 In case of a Frente Polisario victory, it could mean a Frente Polisario guarantee to respect Moroccan citizens and economic interests in the territory, as well as a sort of confederation between a Saharawi Republic and Morocco. In case of a Moroccan victory, it could mean a certain degree of autonomy for the province of Western Sahara and a degree of power sharing for a certain period. In both cases there should be agreement on an amnesty mechanism and on ways of coexistence between remaining Moroccan settlers and returning Saharawi refugees.
In May 1999 the Moroccan King Hassan II died and was succeeded by his son
Mohammed. The new king sacked the Minister of the Interior Driss Basri, a long-time hardliner, and announced a more conciliatory policy towards the Western Sahara. Though
Mohammed VI has not questioned Morocco's sovereignty in the territory, he hinted at the possibility of a solution leading to the territory's autonomy. 19 Although both parties officially stick to the original settlement plan, there may now be more flexibility in the coming negotiations.
Africa's last decolonisation conflict has reached a threshold. If James Baker manages to broker a "Houston II agreement", we could probably see a lasting settlement -with or without a referendum. If not, a protracted desert war would start again. 
